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ORDINARILY, persons who are competent to contract are permit-
ted to determine for themselves what obligations they will assume.
It is only to preveilt injury to the public, that the law interferes
with this freedom of contract. The promotion of the public welfare
is the first consideration of the law. It is the duty of all courts of
justice to keep their eye steadily upon the public interest, even
in the administration of commutative justice. Therefore, any
action founded upon a contract, although not expressly prohibited
by positive law, which in its operation would injure the public, or
which contravenes any established interests of society, or conflicts
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with the morals of the times, cannot be maintained. Thus, one
cannot by contract bargain away his life (Wharton's Criminal
Law, (8th. ed.) see. 145; 1 Wharton on Cont., see. 430), restrain
his right to liberty,I or destroy or materially impair his industrial
usefulness : Dakin v. Williams, 11 Wend. 67 ; Whitney v. Slaton,
40 Me. 224. Likewise, one cannot, for any consideration what-
ever, make a binding contract to abandon his customary calling
and never to engage in it again anywhere. Such a contract oper-
ates as a restriction upon the freedom of trade. Restraints of this
nature will be considered in this article.
I. ORIGIN AND HiSToRY.-The law of these contracts, as it
exists to-day, originated in England. It is said to have sprung
from the English law of apprenticeship; . Parsons on Cont. (7th
ed.) p. 751. This doctrine was also a principle of the Roman law
(Puff.: lib. 5, c. 2, sects. 3, 21, H. VIL 20, cited in Mitchel v.
Reynolds, 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 709; s. c. I P, Wins. 181)
(1811) ; but whether it is recognised in the jurisprudence of any
other country, we are unable to state; yet it is certain that no such
principle prevails in France: Roussillon v. 1oussillon, L. R., 14
Ch. Div. 351; s. c. 19 Am. Law. Reg. 748, and note. Originally
the apprenticeship law of England was unreasonably oppressive.
By it no one could exercise any regular trade or handicraft except
after a long apprenticeship, and, generally, a formal admission to
the proper guild or company was required. For one to relinquish
his trade or mystery, therefore, "was to throw himself out of
employment; to fall as a burden upon the community; to become
a pauper:" 2 Parsons on Cont. (7th ed.) p. 751. Hence it can
easily be perceived why the earlier judges "frowned with great
severity on such contracts."
(a) -Early _English Oases.-The first reported case on this sub-
ject arose during the reign of Henry V. (1415), more than four
centuries ago. Here a dyer bound himself not to exercise his trade
for half a year, and in an action for its enforcement, Judge HULL,
as soon as he heard the bond read, flew into a passion, swore upon
1 "What consideration can a man have received adequate to imprisonment at
hard labor for life ? It is going but one step further to make an agreement to be
hanged. I presume no one would be hardy enough to ask the court to enforce, such
an agreement ; yet the principle is, in both cases, the same :" per TILOHumAN, J.,
in Smith v. Commonwealth, 14 S. & I. (Penn.) 69 ; Whart. on Crim. P1. & Pr.,
sec. 351.
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the bench, and expressing himself with more fervor than decency,
declared in bad French, that if the plaintiff were in court he should
go to prison until he had paid a fine to the king: "Per Dieu, si le
plaintiff fut icy, il irra al prison tang il ut fait fine al Roy"-
By God, if the plaintiff were in court he should go to prison till
he had paid a fine to the king ;-Year Book, 2 Henry V., fol. 5, pl.
26, cited in Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181; Lange v. Werk,
2 Ohio St. 526, 527; Beard v. Dennis, 6 Ind. 202. And as late
as the eighteenth century (1711), Chief Justice PARKER, in refer-
ring to this judge's great displeasure, said that he could not "but
approve the indignation that judge expressed, though not his man-
ner of expressing it :" Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P.Wms. 181 (1711).
The next case in point of time is Colgate v. Bacheler, Cro. Eliz.
872, Owen 143, where one bound himself to abstain from the use
of his trade of haberdasher, for a certain time. ANDERSON, J.,
affecting much surprise that one should be so foolish as to give such
a bond, put the absurdity of the undertaking thus: "I might as
well bind myself not to go to church."
(b) G-rowth of Opinion.
1. FPirst Relaxation of the Old Rule.-Hence, the old rule was
that all contracts in restraint of trade, however limited in their
operation, were void. But as English civilization advanced, com-
merce extended, the avenues of trade and employment multiplied,
competition increased, the severity of the apprenticeship law
abated, thus the reasons for the stringency of the old rule had
in a large measure disappeared, and that fact very soon received
judicial recognition. The first innovation on the old rule was
made in Rogers v. Parry, 2 Bulstr. 136, where it was expressly
declared that one may well bind himself to abandon his trade "for
a certain time and in a certain place."
2. Rule in the beginning of the Seventeenth Century.-This
modification was very soon adopted in other cases. As early as the
year 1621 the principle is thus announced: "Upon a valuable con-
sideration one may restrain himself that he will not use his trade
in such a particular place; for he who gives that consideration
expects the benefit of his customers; and it is usual, here in
London, for one to let his shop and wares to his servant, when
he is out of apprenticeship, as also to covenant that he shall not
use that trade in such a shop or in such a street; so, for a valu-
able con'sideratioh, and voluntarily, one may agree that he will not
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use his trade for volenti non fit injuria :" Broad v. Jollyfe, Cro.
Jac. 596. See, in this connection, Jelliet v. Broad, Noy 98;
Prugnell v. Gosse, Aleyn 67; Clerk v. Tailors of Exeter, 8
Lev. 241.
3. The M"odern Rule.-From time to time, as the social con-
dition changed, a more liberal view has been applied to these kinds
of contracts. And it is not because they are any more legal and
enforceable at this time than they were in the days of Henry V.,
but because the courts look differently at the question as to what is
a restraint of trade: Presbury v. Fisher, 18 Mo. 50; Long v.
Towl, 42 Id. 545; Shrainka v. Scharringhausen, 8 Mo. App.
525. The leading case of Hlitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins.
181; s. c. 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 705, contains a very thorough
exposition of the whole subject, and has been substantially fol-
lowed in most all subsequent cases. (See, also, Parsons on Cont.
(7th ed.) 751; 2 Addison on Cont. (1883), B. V. Abbott's
notes, bottom page 737; 2 Wharton on Cont., sect. 430 ; Smith
on Cont. (5th ed.) 180; 2 Chitty on Cont. 982; -Davis v.
Mason, 5 T. R. 118 ; Bun v. Guy, 4 East 190; Gale v. Reed, 8
Id. 80; Hayward v. Young, 2 Chitty 407; Bryson v. White.
head, 1 Simmons & S. 74; Homer v. Ashford, 3 Bing. 322;
Chappel v. Broekway, 21 Wend. 157). In Mitchel v. Rey-
notds, it was decided that a bond conditioned not to exercise
a certain trade "within a particular parish" was good; but,
observed Chief Justice PARKER, who delivered the opinion,
" where it is given not to exercise a trade throughout the king-
dom, it is bad." This last remark has not escaped criticism.
CHRISTIANcY, J., of the Supreme Court of Michigan, in an elabo-
rate opinion, clearly shows that the observation of the learned
English judge is not always infallible; that there may have been
much reason for making such a declaration more than a century
and a half ago, but he seriously questions whether such a principle
was ever applicable to our condition: Bdal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 519,
520. Judge HowE, of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, has also
taken the same advanced ground: Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pinney
(Wis.) 123; s. o. 3 Chandler (Wis.) 133. And Judge COOLEY has
expressed himself likewise: Article in Am. Ry. Age, April 26th
1884, on "The Popular and Legal View of Railway Pools." But
whatever different views may prevail as to the propriety of allowing
these contracts, the general rule, as deduced from the cases, is that
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all contracts in restraint of trade whose operation is general, are
unenforceable (see authorities, supra, and also Thomas v. 1M1iles's
Adm., 3 Ohio St. 274 (1854); Hedge v. Lowe, 47 Iowa 137 (1877);
Lange v. l"erc, 2 Ohio St. 519 (1853) ; lossop v. Mason, 18 Gr.
Ch. (Ofit.) 453 (1871); s. C. 17 Id. 360 (1870); s. c. 16 Id. 302
(1869); Ifennedy v. Lee, 3 Mer. 440-452 (1817); Caswell v.
Gibbs, 33 Mich. 331 (1876); Gale v. Reed, 8 East 80 (1806);
.inde v. Gray, 1 M. & G. 195 (1840); s. c. 1 Scott N. R. 123;
Peltz v. Eichele, 62 Mo. 171 (1876); Saratoga Co. Bk. v. .ing,
44 N. Y. 87 ; Curtis v. Gokey, 68 Id. 300 (1877); s. c. 5 Hun
555 (1875); Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 223; s. c. 5 Am. Dec.
102); but to this general rule there are a few exceptions which
will be hereafter noticed.
IL FoUNDATION OF THE DOCTRINE.-The reasons of the rule
may well be inferred from what has already been said. Public
policy is its corner-stone. The public demands that there shall be
no restraints upon industry. The industrial. maxim, that " compe-
tition is the life of trade" is the foundation of the doctrine; "there-
fore," say those who believe implicitly in the maxim, "whatever
destroys or even relaxes competition is injurious if not fatal to it."
"The general principles which govern contracts in restraint of
trade," said the Supreme Court of California: in Wright v. Ryder,
36 Cal. 342, 357 (1868), "are well settled both in England
and the United States. They proceed upon the theory that the
public welfare demands that private citizens should not be allowed,
even by their own voluntary contracts, to restrain themselves unrea-
sonably from the prosecutions of trades, callings, or professions, or
from embarking in business enterprises, in the promotion and
encouragement of which the public has an interest." The Supreme
Court of the United States, in Oregon Steam ,.av. Co. v. Winsor, 20
Wall. 67 (1873), per BRADLEY, J., states the reasons of the rule as
follows: " There are two principal grounds upon which the doctrine
is founded that a contract in restraint of trade is void as against
public policy. One is, the injury to the public of being deprived
of the restricted party's industry ; the other is, the injury to the
party himself by being precluded from pursuing his occupation and
thus being prevented from supporting himself and family. It is
evident that both of these evils occur, when the contract is general,
not to pursue one's- trade at all, or not to pursue it in the entire
IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
realm or country. The country suffers the loss in both cases; and
the party is deprived of his occupation, or is obliged to expatriate
himself in order to follow it. A contract that is open to such grave
objections is clearly against public policy."
The individual as well as the public would suffer injury by the
enforcement of such contracts. The loss to society of a valuable
member is a great public injury. The capacity of an individual to
produce, constitutes his value to the public. That branch of indus-
try in which he has been educated and to which he has devoted his
energies, is supposed to be the one in which he can render the
greatest profit, both to himself and the public. The fruits of his
labors belong immediately to himself, but mediately to the public,
and go to swell the aggregate of national wealth. "Therefore," as
Judge HowE once remarked (Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pinney, (Wis.)
124, 150): "the law says to each and every tradesman, you shall
not, for a present sum in hand, alien your right to pursue that call-
ing by which you can produce the most, and add the most to the
public wealth, and compel yourself to a life of supineness and inac-
tion, or to labor in some department less profitable to the state.
And if a man, mindful of his own gain alone, but not of the public
good, will bargain with you to that effect, you are held discharged
from such bargain, because of the advantages that will arise to the
public from so holding." " Competition in trade," remarked the
Supreme Court of New Jersey, "is encouraged by the law, and to
allow any one to use means established and intended for the public
good to promote unfair advantages amongst the people and foster
monopolies, is against public policy, and should not be permitted."
Blessenger v. The Pennsylvania Rd. Go., 3 N. J. Law (8 Vroom)
531 (1874).
BACON declared that such a contract was "against the public
good, deprived the party of his means of livelihood, enabled masters
to lay hardships upon their servants and apprentices ; and tends to
oppression." 2 Bacon's Abridg., p. 299.
CHAPMAN, J., of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, said: " The
law has always regarded monopolies as hostile to the rights and
interests of the public. One method of obtaining them in early
times was by a grant from the sovereign to a particular individual
of the sole right to exercise a particular trade. The mischief
arising from these monopolies became so intolerable that the prac-
tice was suppressed by a clause in Magna CGarta. * * * *
VALIDITY OF CONTRACTS
Another method by which these monopolies were sought to be
obtained, was by private contracts, in which one of the parties
agreed not to engage in some specified trade or business. Taylor
v. Blanchard, 13 Allen 370 (1866).
Judge MORTON, in the leading American case of Alger v. Thacher
19 Pick. (Mass.) 50, s. c. 31 Am. Dec. 119, with note, in an
exhaustive and thoroughly considered opinion, states the reasons
of the rule as follows: " 1. Such contracts injure the parties
making them, because they diminish their means of procuring live-
lihoods and a competency for their families. They tempt improvi-
dent persons, for the sake of present gain, to'deprive themselves of
the power to make future acquisitions ; and they extose such per-
sons to imposition and oppression. 2. They tend to deprive the
public of the services of men in the employments and capacities, of
which they may be most useful to the community as well as them-
selves. 3. They discourage industry and enterprise, and diminish
the products of ingenuity and skill. 4. They prevent competition
and enhance prices. 5. They expose the public to all the evils of
monopoly." This case is followed in 36 Cal. 342 ; 54 N. H. 519;
42 Mo. 549; 40 Me. 230. Chief Justice PARKER, in the great case
of Mitchell v. Reynolds, says, "the contracts work mischief," 1st, to
the party by the loss of his livelihood, and the subsistence of his
family; and 2d, to the public, by depriving it of a useful member.
"Another reason is the great abuses these voluntary restraints are
liable to; as, for instance, from corporations who were perpetually
laboring for exclusive advantages in trade, and to reduce it into as
few hands as possible; as, likewise, from masters who are apt to give
their apprentices much vexation on this account, and to use many
indirect practices to procure such bonds from them, lest they should
prejudice them in their custom when they come to set up for them-
selves." 3d. "Because, in a great many instances, they can be of
no use to the obligee; which holds in all cases of. general restraint
throughout England,-for what does it signify to a tradesman in
London what another does at Newcastle ? And surely it would be
unreasonable to fix a certain loss on one side without any benefit
to the other." 1 P. Wms. 181 (1711). In commenting upon
the first reason assigned by PARKER, C. J., in holding these
contracts void, Judge HowE, in Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pinney 139,
observed ."The opportunities for employment are so abundant
(in this country), and the demand for labor on all sides so pressing
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and urgent, and the supply so limited, that I much question, were
we to consider the question as res integra, if we should feel author-
ized to hold that a man had endangered his own livelihood and
the subsistence of his family by an agreement which merely
excludes him from exercising the trade of a blacksmith or a shoe-
maker, leaving all the other departments of mechanical, agricul-
tural and commercial industry open to him. -And, while we have
no privileged classes here, but little individual and less associated
capital, and while our resources are so imperfectly developed, while
the avenues to enterprise are so multiplied, so tempting, and so
remunerative, giving to labor the greatest freedom from competition
with capital, perhaps, that it has yet enjoyed, I question if we,. -
have much to fear from attempts to secure exclusive advantage n-' .
trade, or to reduce-i, tbfew hands. While so much remains to be
done that all hands caru do, I question if the better way to foster
individual effort be not to secure it the greatest possible freedom,
either to direct it to any particular calling or to abandon that calling
to another for an equivalent."
And, in referring to the 3d reason of PARKER, 0. J., Judge HlowE
continues: "I apprehend it would be thought a dangerous precedent
were the court to annul any other voluntary bond for which a volun-
tary consideration had been received, upon the ground that it was
of fio use to the obligee. * * And certainly I do not understand
why that should be called a certain loss on one side, when, for what
the party has abandoned, he has received an ample equivalent. If
the loss is supposed to arise from a total want of consideration, or
from its inadequacy, these are distinct grounds of interference."
Kellogg v. Larkin, 8 Pinney 124.
III. INTERESTS OF THE PARTIEs.-Thus far it will be seen,
that the interests of the parties have been considered in determining
the validity of these contracts. But whether their interests should
be taken into account, there is a contrariety of opinion.
(a) Affirmative View.-Judge MORTON, in the leading case of
Alger v. Thatcher, 19 Pick. 51, declared that such contracts injure
the parties making them, because they diminish their means of pro-
curing livelihoods and a competency for their families ; they tempt
improvident persons, for the sake of present gain, to deprive them-
selves of the power to make future acquisitions, and expose such
person to imposition and oppression." Lord MACCLESFIELD spoke
VOL. X."XXIII.-29
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of them as working mischief "to the party by the loss of his liveli-
hood and the subsistence of his family." Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1
P. Wms. 181. BACoN denounced them, because they "deprived
the party of his means of livelihood, enabled masters to lay hard-
ship upon their servants and apprentices, and tended to oppression."
2 Bac. Abr. 299.
(b) NVegative Vew.-But CHAPMAN, J., of the Massachusetts
Supreme Court, asserts that the law "protects trade for the sake
of the public, and not for the sake of the parties engaged in it."
Taylor v. Blanchard, 13 Allen (Mass.) 370 (1866). And SELDEN,
J., of the Supreme Court of New York, regards the idea of con-
sidering the interests of the parties as absurd. "The principles of
public policy," says he, "which lie at the foundation of this rule,
would seem to be too obvious, and yet we find it urged in many of
the cases as an objection to the contract, that it tended to deprive
the person bound of the means of obtaining a livelihood, as though
the personal interest of the contracting party had something to do
with the doctrine. * * * It is clear that the validity of the
contract does not depend, in the slightest degree, upon the question
whether it is beneficial or otherwise to the party bound. The
interests of the public alone were considered in the adoption of
the rule." He says the rule is founded upon -the importance of the
freedom of every citizen to engage himself "in that department of
labor in which his personal efforts will be likely to add most to the
aggregate productions of the country," and upon the requirement
of public convenience-" that all the various trades and employ-
ments of society should be pursued each in its due proportion, a
result with which the exclusion of any individual from his accus-
tomed pursuits has a tendency to interfere." Lawrence v. Kidder,
10 Barb. (N. Y.) 641 (1851). This may be considered a leading
case.
(c) Injury to the Party works Misecief to the P'ublic.-But
whichever of the above views we adopt, it is clear that a contract
which is detrimental to the interes.'s of the parties, as above indi-
cated, is also detrimental to the interests of the public. For if any
individual, by contracts, disposes of his means of subsistence and
that of his family, society feels the consequences. He and his
family become subjects of public charity, and the public is deprived
of the fruits of his labor. The policy of the courts is to give as
much freedom as possible to the individual. "Let men make their
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own bargains," is the doctrine. It is not often that men wilfully
and deliberately enter into contracts prejudicial to their own inter-
ests. And, when they do, courts never interpose solely for the
interests of the parties directly concerned, but because of the injury
to the state.' These contracts take the party from his trade, thus
depriving himself and the public of the skill which he has acquired
in his business; and we should remember that as large a number
of skilled men as possible is a desirable element in a country which
strives for commercial supremacy. Therefore, it is clear, that when
Judge BRADLEY assigned as one of the reasons -why these con-
tracts should not be sustained, that "the injury to the party himself
by being precluded from pursuing his occupation, and thus being
prevented from supporting himself and family," he means that the
parties by bringing mischief upon themselves, affect the public
injuriously, and this is the reason why such contracts are against
public policy.
(d) When Interests of the Parties considered.-On the other
hand, we shall hereafter see that the interests of the parties are not
always wholly disregarded, although subservient to that of the
public. Thus contracts contemplating the same restraint may be
valid or invalid, according to the circumstance which induced the
parties to enter into them, and merely because theinterests of the
covenantees required them. But here, as in all contracts of this
nature, the public welfare is first considered, and if it is not involved,
and the interests of either party will be better promoted by them,
the agreements will be enforced ; whereas, if their interests do not
demand them, the courts will declare the contract void. Vhittaker
v. Howe, 3 Beav. 383, 394 (1841) ; Beal v. Chase, 31 Mich. 490
(1875); Roussillon v. Roussillon, L. R. Oh. Div. 351 (1879); s. c.
49 L. J. Oh. (N. S.) 339 ; 42 L. T. (N. S.) 679 ; 28 W. R. 623 ;
Presbury v. Fisher, 18 Mo. 50 ; Callahan v. Donnolly, 45 Cal.
152 (1872); Oregon Steam Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall.
67 (1873).
IV. MODERN VIEws.-As has already been indicated, in refer-
ring to the origin and history of the law governing these contracts,
a more liberal view is steadily growing in favor of them, and able
judges have questioned the reasons for, holding them void. The
maxim, "competition is the life of trade," is the foundation of the
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doctrine. To the common people and to those who have implicit
faith in the axiom, the reasons for pronouncing such contracts void
have lost none of their original vigor. Their instinctive hate
of monopoly still prevails. But learned judges have doubted
that competition always advances commercial enterprises. Judge
MAULE once remarked that, were the question res integra, he should
strongly incline to doubt whether the interests of commerce be really
promoted by the prohibition of such contracts. "Many persons
who are well informed upon the subject, entertain an opinion that
the public would be better served if, by permitting restrictions of
this kind, encouragements were held out to individuals to embark
large capital in trade, and that it would be expedient to allow parties
to enter into any description of contract for that purpose that they
might find convenient." Proctor v. Sargent, Scott N. R. 289,
302 (1840) ; s. c. 2 Man. & G. 20 ; see, to same effect, Palmer v.
Stebbins, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 188 (1825).
(a) Views of CHRISTIANCY, J.-In referring to the objection
that such contracts, if sustained, fostered idleness, Judge CuRIS-
TIANCY, of the Supreme Court of Michigan, remarked that, in this
country, at this time, where a change of occupation is too common
to excite remark,-where merchants become manufacturers, and
lawyers farmers, and farmers traders,-not because they receive a
consideration for doing so, but because, with larger opportunities
for observation than they had at first, they have fully satisfied,them-
selves that such changes will be for their advantage, as oftentimes
they prove to be,-any rule of law which should assume that one
who for a consideration bargains not to follow his previous business,
thereby bound himself to idleness and penury to the detriment
of the state, would be a rule absurd in itself and contrary to general
experience and observation. "On the contrary," says he, " where
such a contract is the result of fair bargaining, the reasonable pre-
sumption is, that each party, in view of all the circumstances which
are within his own intimate knowledge, was able to see how the
bargain was to result to his advantage, and that the party resigning
the business did not do so without being fully satisfied that he was
receiving full equivalent, which would be more advantageous to him
than the property and the brsiness sold. And where a man has
fully decided to sell his business to take up another, can there be
any reason of state policy, why he should be precluded from bar-
IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
gaining for the additional consideration he can obtain, by agreeing
not to engage in the same business ? If a man can sell his business
for ten thousand dollars only, but the purchaser will give twice as
much in case the seller will agree not to engage in a ruinous com-
petition with him, what interest has the public in denying to the
seller the right of selling for this additional sum, or in releasing
him from his bargain, if, after he has received it, he shall coolly
repudiate this portion of the contract, while he keeps the considera-
tion he has received for it? * * * And it certainly can be
no sufficient objection to such a contract, that it may possibly result
in one party going beyond the state limits to engage in the same
business anew. What if it shall do so ? Are ohr interests as a
state so petty or exclusive and our policy so narrow and invidious,
that we frame rules to keep people within the state contrary to
their inclination, or when it would be for their interest to go else-
where ? Yet this narrow, illiberal and exclusive policy must cer-
tainly be relied upon, if the tendency of a contract to induce a
contracting party to leave the state is to defeat the contract. If
such a position is sound, then a contract made in this state for the
services of a citizen at Chicago, or any other point outside the
state, should be treated as void here, because depriving the state
of the benefit that might flow from the industry of one of its
citizens ! Or, to take a case still more exactly parallel: Partners
in trade at Superior City might divide their stocks, and one, for a
consideration, agree that he would remove his share across the river
to Duluth, and not again engage in the business at Superior City ;
but this agreement, though perfectly reasonable, considered with
reference to the individual only, would, on this doctrine, be void,
because a state policy which has come down to us from semi-
civilized or less enlightened times, when governments were accus-
tomed to prohibit artizans from leaving the realm, and gold and
silver from being exported, is supposed to be violated by the transfer
of the industry and capital of a citizen across a river into another
state." Beal v. C7tase, 31 Mich. 490.
(b) Views of HowE, J.-In referring to the maxim that "Com-
petition is the life of trade," Judge HowE, of the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin, remarked: "But I apprehend that is not true, that
' competition is the life of trade.' On the other hand, that maxim
is one of the least reliable of the host that may be picked up in
every market place. It is, in fact, the shibboleth of mere gambling
